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COMMENTS
$35 during any one week regardless of the number of disabilities
he has suffered or the number of employers liable for compensa-
tion. This position can be supported on policy grounds. Presum-
ably the question will not be finally settled until the Supreme
Court or the Legislature acts upon it.
William M. Nolen
The Doctrine, of Anticipatory Breach of Contract
In the recent case of Marek v. McHardy1 the Supreme Court
announced that the common law doctrine of anticipatory breach
of contract 2 is now law in Louisiana. The purpose of this Com-
ment is to outline the most significant features of that doctrine
at common law,3 and to compare these features with established
principles of Louisiana law.
THE DOCTRINE AT COMMON LAW
In General
At common law it is well-settled that when a contracting
party learns from his obligor prior to the time for performance
of the contract that the obligor does not intend to comply with
his contractual obligation, the party so informed may sue his
obligor immediately, as for a present breach of contract.4 Fur-
thermore, whether or not the obligee in this situation chooses
to bring his action at the time of the repudiation, he may never-
theless discontinue his own performance under the contract
without fear of prejudicing his right of action against the obli-
gor. 5 In other words, the doctrine Of anticipatory breach of
contract includes two basic principles: (1) that the party re-
ceiving an anticipatory repudiation of a contractual obligation
1. 24 La. 841, 101 So.2d 689 (1958). See Note, 33 TUL. L REV. 229 (1958).
2. A more accurate title for the doctrine might be "the doctrine of breach of
contract by anticipatory repudiation."
3. For a complete discussion of the doctrine at common law, see 4 CoRaBIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 959-989 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1296-1337A (rev. ed.
1937). Other discussions include Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the En-
forcement of Contractual Duties, 22 Mimi. L. REV. 329 (1924) ; Limburg, Antici-
patory Repudiation of Contracts, 10 CORN. L.Q. 135 (1925) ; Vold, Withdrawal
of Repudiation After Anticipatory Breach of Contract, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 9 (1926) ;
Vold, Repudiation of Contracts, 5 NEB. L. BULL. 269 (1927); Vold, The Tort
Aspect of Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1927) ;
Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, 14 HARV. L. REV. 317, 421 (1901) ; Comment,
Anticipatory Breach in Louisiana, 7 TuL. L. REV. 586 (1933).
4. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 959 (1951), and authorities therein cited.
5. Id. §§ 960, 975.
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may bring an immediate suit; and (2) that the repudiatee in
this situation need not continue with his part of the perform-
ance, but may discontinue performance immediately without
fear of prejudicing his right against the repudiator. 6
The leading case in a long line of common law decisions
recognizing the doctrine of immediate suit for an anticipatory
breach is Hochster v. De la Tour.7 In that case defendant re-
pudiated an employment contract and plaintiff brought suit
prior to the time performance was to begin. Defendant objected
that this suit was premature, contending that the repudiation
amounted to an offer to rescind the contract, and that if plain-
tiff accepted the offer to rescind, he would thereby render him-
self unable to recover damages for breach of contract. Accord-
ing to defendant's argument, if plaintiff did not accept the offer
to rescind, he was obligated to hold himself ready to perform
until the time for performance, at which time he could bring
his action for damages for breach of contract. The court, seeing
no reason why plaintiff should have to hold himself in readiness
to perform the contract for several weeks before bringing his
action for damages, rejected defendant's argument and gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Apparently it did not occur to the
court that the legal effect of defendant's repudiation might be
to make it unnecessary for plaintiff to remain ready to perform
under the contract without at the same time giving him an im-
mediate action for damages. If the court had taken notice of
the fact that it is in no way inconsistent to allow plaintiff to
look for another job while at the same time making him wait
until the time for performance before bringing his action, the
desired result in this case might have been reached without
giving rise to the anticipatory breach doctrine.8
Several objections have been made to the rule of the Hochster
case." It is objected that it is illogical to conclude that the breach
of a promise is possible other than by non-performance in ac-
cordance with its terms. However, as pointed out by Professor
Corbin, 10 this is not an area in which logic has controlled the
6. This second principle was existing law in England prior to the formulation
of the anticipatory breach rule. Ibid.
7. 2 El. & BI. 678 (K. B. 1853). See discussion in 4 COBIN, CONTRACTK§ 960 (1951). See also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1313 (rev. ed. 1937) ; Ballan-
tine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual Duties, 22 MIcH.
L. REv. 329 (1924) ; Note, 33 TUL. L. REV. 229 (1958).
8. 4 CoRniN, CONTRACTS § 960 (1951).
9. Id. § 961.
10. Ibid.
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development of the law; the law is supposedly an instrument
with which to work justice, rather than an inanimate creature
of logic. Moreover, there is room for argument that the Hochster
rule is in no way illogical. An argument which seems persuasive
to this writer is that a suit based upon an anticipatory repudia-
tion is not in reality a suit for the breach of any promise, ex-
press or implied, in the contract, but for the breach of a con-
tractual duty not to impair the obligee's confidence in the con-
tract.1 Such an argument is persuasive largely because of the
emphasis it places on security in business transactions.
A second objection to the Hochster rule is to the effect that
it works injustice to the defendant to make him pay damages
for the breach of a promise he has never made. 12 This argument
can be dispelled by pointing out that the action is not brought
against the defendant because of his failure to perform in ac-
cordance with his promise, but rather because of his wrongful
and injurious repudiation of his contractual duty to preserve
the obligee's confidence in the contract.
A third and more serious objection to the Hochster rule is
.that allowing suit to be brought before the time fixed for per-
formance increases the difficulty of calculating damages, in that
it requires an estimate on the part of the court as to the extent
of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. 3 It is submitted that
this objection is largely overcome by the following two con-
siderations. In the first place, in a large percentage of cases,
even though suit is instituted prior to the time performance is
due under the contract, judgment will not be rendered until
after the time for performance, due to the slowness of judicial
procedure. In the second place, justice often requires that dam-
ages be awarded for injury to be endured in the future in tort
as well as in contract cases, and it is not believed that the dif-
ficulties of such awards are any more prohibitive in cases of
anticipatory breach.14
Despite the above arguments against the doctrine of antici-
patory breach, it is now law in most Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions. 15 The wide acceptance of the doctrine is not difficult to
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. The doctrine appears to be well-settled throughout the United States,
with the exception of Nebraska and Massachusetts. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1314 (rev. ed. 1937). Even in those two states there is substantial movement
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understand, although specific justifications for the doctrine are
more difficult to articulate than are the objections to it. One
justification for allowing an immediate action in cases of an
anticipatory repudiation is that such repudiation often causes
instant injury to the repudiatee, which injury is different from
that caused by actual non-performance.16 Then, too, the repudia-
tion by the defendant is generally indefensible. Awarding im-
mediate damages for the anticipatory breach seems only fair
and equitable."
Unilateral Contracts
It has been frequently held that an anticipatory repudiation
of a unilateral contract is not actionable. 8 Such holdings are
based upon the notion that the reason for holding an anticipa-
tory repudiation to be a breach of contract is that otherwise the
injured party must continue to perform on his own part.1 ' Since
this reason would not apply to a unilateral contract because no
duty to perform exists in the repudiatee, the courts think it
unnecessary to apply the doctrine to unilateral contracts. But
as pointed out above in the discussion of the Hochster case, 20
the reasons for holding an anticipatory repudiation to be a
breach of contract are much more general. It is believed that
the reasons on which the doctrine can actually be sustained are
equally as applicable to unilateral contracts as to bilateral. 1
Another proposed reason for the rule that the doctrine does
not apply to unilateral contracts is that perhaps the most com-
mon kind of unilateral contract is the promise to pay money,
such as a promissory note.2 2 It is argued by some writers that
allowing suit on a promissory note prior to its coming due would
be tantamount to maturing a money obligation before its due
date.23 This concept is often expressed in the phrase "acceler-
ating the date of maturity. ' 24 However, Corbin and others argue
that this is not the case, although it appears so superficially.
toward an acceptance of the doctrine. Some writers argue that the doctrine is
now law in Nebraska. Vold, Repudiation of Contracts. 5 NEB. L. BULL. 269
(1927).
16. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 961 (1951).
17. Ibid.
18. Id. § 962.
19. Ibid.
20. See page 120 supra.
21. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 962 (1951).
22. Id. § 963.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. § 965.
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They argue that awarding money damages for the injurious
repudiation of a promise to pay money is no more allowing spe-
cific performance of that contract than is awarding damages
for the repudiation of a promise to convey land.2 5
A third reason for the view that the doctrine of anticipatory
breach does not apply to unilateral contracts is associated with
the notion that the two basic premises of the anticipatory breach
doctrine are inseparable. In other words, since the principle
that the repudiation justifies discontinuance of his performance
by the repudiatee would not apply in the case of a contract
wherein the repudiatee has no obligation to perform, i.e., a uni-
lateral contract, the entire doctrine should not be applied in
these cases. The flaw in this argument is apparent on its face.
There is no valid objection to applying the applicable portion
of the doctrine to unilateral contracts, although part of the doc-
trine is inapplicable.
In any event, despite arguments that it should be otherwise,
this is the present situation. The anticipatory breach doctrine
is generally recognized in cases involving bilateral contracts
provided that both sides are at least partly executory; it is not
generally recognized in cases involving unilateral contracts.26
Retraction
Another facet of the anticipatory breach doctrine which
should be considered is the fact that as long as the repudiatee
does not materially change his position in reliance on the re-
pudiation, the repudiator may retract it and announce his in-
tention to go through with the contract. The retraction may be
either express or tacit, provided the repudiatee has actual no-
tice of it.27 If the repudiator does effectively retract his re-
pudiation, the effect of the repudiation as a breach is nullified,
and the repudiatee's obligation is reinstated.2 8 However, in order
to operate as a restoration of the contract, the retraction must
be made when the repudiator is in a position to perform his
obligation in all material respects. - 1 Furthermore, any signifi-
25. Ibid. See Comment, Anticipatory Breach, of Unilateral Contracts, 36 YALE
L.J. 263 (1926).
26. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §962 (1951). A bilateral contract, one side of
which had been fully performed prior to the repudiation, is for purposes of this
rule a unilateral contract.
27. Id. § 960.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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cant change of position by the repudiatee in reliance on the
repudiation will be sufficient to prevent an effective retrac-
tion.3 0 Bringing suit is one sort of reliance making effective
retraction impossible.8 1
Manifestation
There is no hard and fast rule as to what sort of manifesta-
tion is necessary to amount to a repudiation.3 2 The general rule
is that any unequivocal manifestation, either express or implied,
of intention not to go through with the contract, or of inability
to do so, will be sufficient.33 This would include repudiation of
the contract by making performance of it impossible .
4
Measure of Damages
The common law rule that damages are to be measured as of
the time for performance" is not changed in the case of an
anticipatory breach.36 It is true that if the breach is not antici-
patory, the time for performance will have arrived when the
breach occurs. However, although the calculation of damages
may be more difficult, the general rule applies to the anticipa-
tory breach.3
7
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
According to some authorities, the doctrine of anticipatory
breach was not recognized in the civil law until comparatively
recent times.3 8 One writer suggests that this has been true
largely because of the civil law principle that specific perform-
ance is the preferred remedy for a breach of contract, as op-
posed to the common law preference for the award of damages.3 9
Since it is illogical to specifically enforce an agreement prior to
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Id. § 973.
33. Ibid.
34. Id. § 984.
35. Id. § 961; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 587 (rev. ed. 1937).
36. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 961 (1951).
37. Of course, it could be contended that calculating damages to be awarded
in a suit for anticipatory breach on the basis of the extent of the injury at the
time for performance is inconsistent with one of the justifications posed for the
doctrine, i.e., that the obligee has suffered a present injury by the repudiation
different from that which he would suffer by a breach of the entire contract.
38. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1337A (rev. ed. 1937), quoted in Marek V.
McHardy, 234 La. 841, 856, 101 So.2d 689, 694 (1958). See also Comment,
Anticipatory Repudiation in Louisiana, 7 TuL. L. R v. 586 (1933).
39. 5 Wr..uwTO, CONmAOTS I 1337A (rev. ed. 1987).
[Vol. XX
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the time for performance, the courts hesitate to allow an action
for an anticipatory breach. This reasoning, however, is subject
to question. In the first place, the fact that most civil law juris-
dictions prefer specific performance as a remedy for a breach
of contract does not present an iron-clad objection to the adop-
tion of the anticipatory breach doctrine in those jurisdictions.
To say that specific enforcement is the preferred remedy is not
to say that it is the only one available. Just as in the common
law a decree of specific performance may, in appropriate cases,
be substituted for the award of damages, so in the civil law the
award of damages could be substituted for specific enforcement.
Further, the statement that specific enforcement is the preferred
remedy for breach of contract in civil law is not unqualifiedly
true. In France the award of damages is preferred in contracts
to do, as opposed to contracts to give or to deliver. 40  Further-
more, in Louisiana the rule as to the preferred remedy for
breach of contract is not entirely clear. Articles 1926 and 1927
of the Civil Code 41 would seem to indicate that the award of
damages is a substitute for specific performance only in obli-
gations to do.42 It could be argued that the negative implica-
tion of these articles is that specific enforcement is available in
other cases. However, the cases are not in accord with that
interpretation. Accepting the statement of the cases that the
40. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1142 (1804) provides: "Every obligation to do or
not to do resolves itself into damages, in case of non-performance on the part of
the debtor." Nevertheless, it may be proper to say with the majority of the French
commentators that, as a consequence of the wide discretion assumed by the courts
in specifically enforcing obligations to do or not to do with the aid of the method
of astreintes (7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
84, no 787 (1931)), specific performance is the rule rather than the exception
even as to such obligations. However, there is still a judicial reluctance to compel
the performance of a personal act. I BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRArr
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D DROIT CIVIL - DES OBLIGATIONS 469, no 431 (3
ed. 1906) ; 24 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITIl DES CONTRATS OU DES OBLIGATIONS CONVEN-
TIONNELLES EN GENERAL 486, no 488 (1877).
41. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1926 (1870) : "On the breach of any obligation to do,
or not to do, the obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases which permit
it, to a specific performance of the contract, at his option, or he may require the
dissolution of the contract, and in all these cases damages may be given where
they have accrued, according to the rules established in the following section."
Id. art. 1927: "In ordinary cases, the breach of such a contract entitles the
party aggrieved only to damages, but where this would be an inadequate compensa-
tion, and the party has the power of performing the contract, he may be con-
strained to a specific performance by means prescribed in the laws which regulate
the practice of the courts."
42. This would be in accord with the French view. See note 40 supra.
Following the spirit of these articles, it has been consistently held that specific
performance of contracts to do or not to do is not favored and cannot be de-
manded as a matter of right. Tri-State Transit Co. v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.,
181 La. 779, 160 So. 411 (1935) ; Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012
(1911) ; Caperton v. Forrey, 49 La. Ann. 872, 21 So. 600 (1897) ; Mirandona v.
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award of damages is the preferred remedy in Louisiana,43 spe-
cific enforcement being given only when damages would prove
inadequate,4 4 there seems to be no objection in this regard to
the adoption of the anticipatory breach doctrine in Louisiana.
Although no express recognition of the anticipatory breach
doctrine in Louisiana prior to the Marek case has been discov-
ered, there have nevertheless been cases in which the question of
allowing the institution of suit prior to the time for performance
has arisen.45 Cases involving the problem of allowing suit prior
to the time performance is due include the line of cases which
allow suit by a landowner for rent for the entirety of the lease
period when the tenant abandons the leased premises prior to
the expiration of the lease. 46 However, the landowner can exe-
Burg, 49 La. Ann. 656, 21 So. 723 (1897) ; Solomon v. Diefenthal, 46 La. Ann.
897, 15 So. 183 (1894) ; New Orleans & Orleans Levee Board v. New Orleans &
N.E. R.R., 44 La. Ann. 64, 10 So. 401 (1892).
43. T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines v. Leonard Truck Lines, 57 F. Supp. 628
(D.D.C. 1945); Goudeau v. Daigle, 124 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 695 (1942); Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939); New
Orleans Polo Club v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 128 La. 1044, 55 So. 668 (1911) ;
Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012 (1911) ; Viator v. Patout, 1 La. App.
362 (1924). See also Manning v. Cohen, 124 La. 869, 50 So. 778 (1909) ; Rice
v. Rice, 46 La. Ann. 711, 15 So. 538 (1894); New Orleans & Orleans Levee
Board v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 44 La. Ann. 64, 10 So. 401 (1892) ; Posner
v. Dale & Son, 3 La. App. 577 (1926) ; Michel v. Southern Ins. Co., 8 Or. App.
24 (La. App. 1910).
44. Fuselier v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 471 (D.D.C. 1953) ; Tri-State
Transit Co. v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 181 La. 779, 160 So. 411 (1935) ; New
Orleans Polo Club v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 128 La. 1044, 55 So. 668 (1911) ;
Gauche v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 125 La. 530, 51 So. 573 (1910) ; Mirandona
v. Burg, 49 La. Ann. 656, 21 So. 723 (1897) ; Caperton v. Forrey, 49 La. Ann.
872, 21 So. 600 (1897); Rice v. Rice, 46 La. Ann. 711, 15 So. 538 (1894);
New Orleans & Orleans Levee Board v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 44 La. Ann.
64, 10 So. 401 (1892) ; Levin's Auction Exchange v. Samuels, 28 So.2d 340 (La.
App. 1947) ; Blackshear v. Sandifer, 132 So. 282 (La. App. 1931) ; Youngblood
v. Daily & Weekly Signal Tribune, 131 So. 604 (La. App. 1930) ; Gerson v.
Benson, Orleans No. 8373 (La. App. 1923).
45. In Aronson v. Klein, 175 La. 506, 143 So. 389 (1932), plaintiff assigned
to the defendant his interest in a contract for the purchase of land from a third
party. The defendant gave in payment therefor a note payable "at the time of
act of sale." Subsequently he seemingly abandoned the transaction and refused to
pay the note on demand. Plaintiff sued on the note, and the defense was set up
that the suit was prematurely brought. Thus the question of allowing the institu-
tion of suit prior to the time performance was due was squarely presented to
the court. The court did not decide the case on that basis, instead basing its
decision on the theory that selling the property was a suspensive condition to
the defendant's liability on the note, and that by refusing to pass the act of sale
defendant made the performance of the condition impossible, thereby maturing
his obligation and becoming immediately liable on the note under Article 2040.
This article provides that "the condition is considered as fulfilled, when the ful-
fillment of it has been prevented by the party bound to perform it."
46. Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 144 La. 1074, 81 So. 718 (1919)
Succession of Romero, 137 La. 236, 68 So. 433 (1915) ; American Machinery &
Construction Co. v. Stewart & Haas, 115 La. 100, 38 So. 960 (1905) ; O'Kelley
v. Ferguson, 49 La. Ann. 1230, 22 So. 783 (1897) ; Henderson v. Meyers & Bro.,
45 La. Ann. 798, 13 So. 191 (1893) ; Holden v. Tanner, 6 La. Ann. 74 (1851) ;
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cute judgment only to the extent of provoking the sale of the
lessee's property seized under his lessor's privilege.4 7 Beyond
the value of such property, he is relegated to the position of an
ordinary creditor.4s Since this privilege of bringing suit prior
to the expiration of the lease period is in furtherance of the
lessor's privilege, many of the cases contain language to the
effect that this is an "extraordinary privilege" of the landowner.
The privilege of bringing suit prior to the expiration of
the contract period is extended to creditors in bankruptcy,49
and to creditors of an insolvent, provided there has been an
actual surrender of property. 0 Other cases allow the institution
of suit by a wrongfully discharged employee for the entirety of
salary or wages due under the contract, even though the con-
tract period has not expired. These cases are based on Article
2749,r2 which provides this recourse for the wrongfully dis-
charged employee.
At this point it should be remembered that the common law
doctrine of anticipatory breach consists of two basic principles:
Sigur v. Lloyd, 1 La. Ann. 421 (1846) ; Roumage v. Blatrier, 11 Rob. 101 (La.
1845); Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839); Christy v. Casanave, 2 Mart.
(N.S.) 451 (La. 1824) ; Dixon v. Alford, 143 So. 679 (La. App. 1932) ; Massett
v. C. G. Conn Co., Ltd., 127 So. 638 (La. App. 1930).
47. Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 144 La. 1074, 81 So. 718 (1919)
Succession of Romero, 137 La. 236, 68 So. 433 (1915); Reynolds v. Swain, 13
La. 193 (1839).
48. The landlord in this situation can also re-let the premises, applying the
revenue therefrom to the credit of the original tenant. See Sirianos v. Hill,
Harris & Co., 224 La. 80, 68 So.2d 757 (1953).
49. Carollo v. President of Bank of United States, 10 Rob. 533 (La. 1845).
The National Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C., §§ 91-1255 (1952), largely suspends
the provisions of Louisiana law in regard to bankruptcy. Under this act, the
obligor's bankruptcy is counted as an anticipatory breach of an executory contract,
and an immediate action may be brought thereon. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co.
v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 133 (1937).
50. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2054 (1870) : "Whenever there is a cession of prop-
erty, either voluntary or forced, all debts due by the insolvent shall be deemed
to be due, although contracted to be paid at a term not yet arrived; but in such
case, a discount must be made of the interest at the highest conventional rate, if
none has been agreed to by the contract." See Succession of Gravolet, 195 L-a.
832, 197 So. 572 (1940) ; C. T. Patterson Co. v. Port Barre Lumber Co., 136
La. 60, 66 So. 418 (1914); Kleinworth v. Llingender, 14 La. Ann. 96 (1859);
Carollo v. Bank of United States, 10 Rob. 533 (La. 1845) ; Millaudon v. Foucher,
8 La. 582 (1835) ; Atwill v. Belden & Co., 1 La. 500 (1830).
51. See, e.g., Long v. Charles Kaufman Co., 122 La. 281, 47 So. 606 (1908)
Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La. Ann. 143, 14 So. 241 (1893) ; Shea v. Schlatre, . Rob.
319 (La. 1842); Sherborne v. Orleans Cotton Press, 15 La. 360 (La. 1840)
Aymond v. Haas Inv. Co., 59 So.2d 479 (La. App. 1952).
52. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2749 (1870): "If, without any serious ground of
complaint, a man should send away a laborer whose services he has hired for a
certain time, before that time has expired, he shall be bound to pay to such
laborer the whole of the salaries which he would have been entitled to receive.
had the full term of his services arrived."
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(1) that the repudiatee may bring an instant action as for a
present breach of contract; and (2) that the repudiatee, whether
or not he chooses to rely on the repudiation as a present breach,
has a defense to any claim by the repudiator that he has failed
to go through with his part of the bargain. This second principle
could be said to constitute a modified application of the Lou-
isiana rule that a party is under a duty to mitigate damages. 58
This rule simply means that a party under a contract must take
reasonable steps to prevent the needless enhancement of dam-
ages. It is not extended, in most cases, to require that a party
receiving an anticipatory repudiation of his obligor's contractual
obligation enter a covering contract,5 4 but it does mean that he
must discontinue his performance where a failure to do so would
result only in increasing the amount of harm caused by the re-
pudiation. The duty of mitigation being accepted, it is apparent
that the repudiatee need not continue with his performance.
Indeed in many instances he will be under a duty to discontinue.
At first glance it is plausible that Articles 1912 and 191315
support the argument that the doctrine of anticipatory breach is
inconsistent with the Louisiana law. Under Article 1912 it is
necessary for an injured party, before suing for damages, to
put the other party in default. According to 1913, he cannot
put the other party in default unless he himself is ready and
willing to perform at the time and at the place stipulated in the
contract. Of course, if these articles apply in the case of an
anticipatory repudiation, they would require that the repudiatee
wait until the time stipulated for performance before putting
the repudiator in default and suing him for damages. However,
53. Noland v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 96 So.2d 360 (La. App. 1957) ; Baird
v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 38 So.2d 669 (La. App. 1951); Mossler
Acceptance Corp. v. Naquin, 31 So.2d 247 (La. App. 1947) ; Mayer v. Succession
of McClellan, 30 So.2d 788 (La. App. 1947) ; Interurban Transp. Co. v. F. Strauss
& Sons, 196 So. 367 (La. App. 1940) ; Andrews v. Foster, 170 So. 563 (La. App.
1936).
54. See, e.g., Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co., Inc., 222 La.
627, 63 So.2d 144 (1953).
55. LA. ClVIL CODE art. 1912 (1870) : "The effects of being put in default are
not only that, in contracts to give, the thing which is the object of the stipula-
tion is at the risk of the person in default; but in the cases hereinafter provided
for it is a prerequisite to the recovery of damages and of profits and fruits, or
the rescission of the contract."
Id. art. 1913: "In commutative contracts, where the reciprocal obligations are
to be performed at the same time, or the one immediately after the other, the
party who wishes to put the other in default, must, at the time and place ex-
pressed in, or implied by the agreement, offer or perform, as the contract requires,
that which on his part was to be performed, otherwise the opposite party will not
be legally put in default."
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it is doubtful that the articles do apply to such a situation.
There is a line of Louisiana cases which holds that in the event
of a manifestation of intention not to perform on the part of
an obligor, the obligee need not put him in default before bring-
ing suit, such a manifestation being an active breach of the
contract.5 In such event no putting in default is necessary
under the provisions of Article 1932,7 which provides that when
there is an active breach, the creditor is under no obligation to
put the debtor in default in order to entitle him to an action. It
would seem that this jurisprudential rule should apply in the
case of a manifestation of intention not to perform made prior
to the time performance is due, as well as to such a manifesta-
tion made at the time for performance. If this rule does apply,
then Articles 1912 and 1913 are not inconsistent with the an-
ticipatory breach doctrine.
Even if it should be held that the cases which hold that no
putting in default is necessary in the event of a positive mani-
festation of intention not to perform have no application to the
anticipatory repudiation situation, there is still room for argu-
ment that Articles 1912 and 1913 present no objection to the
anticipatory breach doctrine. It should be noted in this regard,
that the peculiar wordinge8 of Article 1913 has occasioned con-
siderable perplexity in other areas of the law.59 It is plausible
that this article was intended to mean that the injured party
must have been willing and ready to perform at some time sub-
stantially close to that stipulated in the contract. In the case
of an anticipatory breach, this interpretation would not conflict
with an immediate suit. Another possible argument is that Ar-
ticle 1913 simply should not be applied in the case of an antici-
patory breach, as this article was presumably designed to pre-
56. Woolie v. Carson Carbon Co., 177 La. 990, 149 So. 551 (1933); Stockle-
bach v. Bradley, 157 La. 336, 105 So. 363 (1925) ; Shelby Mills v. Nami, 1 La.
App. 116 (1924) ; Allen v. Steers, 39 La. Ann. 586, 2 So. 199 (1887) ; Camors v.
Madden, 36 La. Ann. 425 (1884); Abels v. Glover, 15 La. Ann. 247 (1860).
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1932 (1870) : "When there is an active violation of
the contract, damages are due from the moment the act of contravention has
been done, and the creditor is under no obligation to put the other in default in
order to entitle him to his action."
58. The injured party must offer to perform "at the time" stipulated in the
contract before he can put the other party in default. Carried to its logical con-
clusion, this would mean that if the injured party waited until after the time
performance was due, giving the other party a few extra days before making
demand, he would be unable to bring suit.
59. See Everhardt v. Sighinolfi, 232 La. 996, 95 So.2d 632 (1957) ; Di Cristina
v. Weiser, 215 La. 115, 42 So.2d 868 (1949). See also Erwin v. Fenwick, 6
Mart.(N.S.) 229.,(La. 1827).
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vent "surprise suits" by injured parties.6 0 Certainly a party
who unjustifiedly manifests his intention not to go through With
his contractual obligation when it comes due should not be heard
to complain that he is surprised at being sued for breach of con-
tract.
Another possible objection to the adoption of the anticipa-
tory breach doctrine in Louisiana is presented by Article 2052.
This article provides: "What is due only at a certain time, can-
not be demanded before the expiration of the intermediate
time. . . ." It seems clearly to stand for the proposition that an
obligation may not be sued upon until it is due. A case in which
this article was applied is American Machinery & Construction
Co. v. Stewart & Haas,6 1 wherein the right to recover judgment
for future royalties on the ground that the defendant had aban-
doned some rented machines and refused to comply with the
contract was denied, and the action declared premature. How-
ever, in the final analysis the defense of prematurity was sus-
tained because in consequence of other provisions in the contract
the obligation to pay the royalties was contingent on future
events, the outcome of which could not be foreseen at the time
of suit. In other words, the court found that the "equity of the
case" would "be reached" 62 by delaying the right to sue. It is
significant that no judicial interpretation of Article 2052 which
is directly at odds with the anticipatory breach doctrine has
been discovered.
Another argument against the construction of Article 2052
as presenting an obstacle to the adoption of the anticipatory
breach doctrine might be that Article 20536 modifies 2052 to
a certain extent. Article 2053 provides that "the term is always
presumed to be stipulated in favor of the debtor, unless it result
from the stipulation, or from circumstances, that it was also
agreed upon in favor of the creditor." Presumably this would
mean that if the debtor wants to accelerate payment of his
obligation he can do so."4 It could be argued from this assump-
tion that the obligor can accelerate the due date of his obligation
60. This conclusion is at least tenable from the wording of the article. See
note 55 supra.
61. 115 La. 192, 38 So. 960 (1905).
62. Id. at 195, 38 So. at 961.
63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2053 (1870).
64. If the term is stipulated in the debtor's favor, he will presumably be able
to pay off the entire obligation at any time prior to its coming due, in the absence
of circumstances bringing his conduct under some other prohibition.
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even as against his own interest, and that an anticipatory re-
pudiation of his obligation should be counted as such an accelera-
tion.
Another article which would seem to lend considerable sup-
port to the anticipatory breach doctrine is Article 1932,5 which
provides: "When there is an active violation of the contract,
damages are due from the moment the act of contravention has
been done, and the creditor is under no obligation to put the
debtor in default in order to entitle him to his action." As men-
tioned above in the discussion of Article 2052, there is juris-
prudence to the effect that an unequivocal manifestation of in-
tention not to perform constitutes an active breach of the con-
tract, and no putting in default is necessary. 6 These cases, of
course, are not direct authority for the proposition that a re-
pudiation of one's obligation prior to the time performance is
due amounts to an active breach, as they deal with such mani-
festations made at the time performance was due. However, it
is certainly arguable that these cases are indirect authority for
that proposition, as there seems no reason to make a distinction
between the two situations. Added support for the proposition
that an anticipatory repudiation amounts to an active breach is
found in Article 1931,67 which states that "a contract may be
violated .. .actively by doing something inconsistent with the
obligation it has proposed." Article 1901 provides that agree-
ments must be performed with good faith.6 8 An anticipatory
repudiation seems to constitute a clear violation of these pro-
visions, as it appears to be a bad faith action which is incon-
sistent with the obligation. Therefore, it seems entirely plausible
that a manifestation of intention not to go through with the con-
tract, even though made prior to the time for performance
stipulated in the contract, should be held to be "doing some-
thing inconsistent with the obligation," and therefore an active
breach. 69 If an anticipatory repudiation of an obligation is an
active breach, then Article 1932 is direct authority for allowing
an immediate suit for damages, in that it states that "damages
65. Id. art. 1932.
66. See note 55 supra.
67. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1931 (1870).
68. Id. art. 1901: "Agreements . . . must be performed with good faith."
69. If a manifestation of intention not to go through with the contract, made
at the time performance is due, is an active breach, it seems entirely sound to
contend that such a manifestation made prior to the time performance is due
would also be an active breach.
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are due from the moment the act of contravention, has been
done."
An area in which the Louisiana law may require some quali-
fication of the anticipatory breach doctrine is the situation
where the repudiator retracts his repudiation. At common law
the repudiator may retract his repudiation and restore the con-
tractual obligations as long as the repudiatee has made no ma-
terial change of position in reliance on the repudiation. 70 The
institution of suit by the repudiatee would be such reliance as
to preclude retraction. 71 This proposition would probably not
be accepted in Louisiana in view of Article 2047,72 which pro-
vides that the obligee may be allowed further time in which to
comply with his contractual obligation even after the institution
of suit. Presumably this principle would be applied in cases
where suit is instituted prior to the time performance was due
under the contract, as well as in suits at or after that time.
Thus, even though the repudiatee had instituted suit based upon
the repudiation, the repudiator under 2047 could be allowed to
retract his repudiation and go through with the contract.
Another area in which the anticipatory breach doctrine may
require some modification is in the matter of the calculation of
damages. At common law it is established that damages are to
be calculated on the basis of the extent of the injury as of the
time performance is due under the contract.7 3 The rule in Lou-
isiana is not so clear. It is true that language is often found in
the decisions indicating that damages are to be calculated as
of the time of the breach.7 4 However, it is arguable that, as the
anticipatory breach situation is largely undeveloped here, the
courts have not intended to make a distinction between the time
of the breach and the time performance is due. 75 In Friedman
Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird, Inc.,76 there was an anticipa-
tory repudiation on the part of the defendant. Suit was brought
70. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 980 (1951).
71. Ibid.
72. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2047 (1870): "In all cases the dissolution of a coil-
tract may be demanded by a suit or by exception, . .. and the party in default
may, according to circumstances, have a further time allowed for the performance
of the conditions."
73. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 961 (1951).
74. See, e.g., McCord v. The West Feliciana R.R., 3 La. Ann. 285 (1848)
Seaton v. The Second Municipality of New Orleans, 3 La. Ann. 44 (1848).
75. Of course, in situations other than those involving an anticipatory breach,
the time of the breach and the time performance is due under the contract will be
the same.
76. 222 La. 627, 63 So.2d 144 (1953).
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after the time for performance. The court said damages were
to be calculated as of the "date of the breach. ' 77 However, there
is substantial room for argument that this language was not
intended to establish a distinction between the time of the breach
and the time performance is due, in view of the fact that the
court was there announcing the date of the breach as opposed to
the date of trial as a basis for calculating damages. At one
point in the opinion the court states the rule in terms of "time
for delivery.178 If it should be decided that the Friedman case
is authority for the proposition that in the case of an anticipa-
tory breach damages are to be calculated as of the time of the
breach, there is room for valid argument that such a rule would
be unsound. This argument would be based on the principle
that damages are generally supposed to be based on the contem-
plation of the parties ;711 ordinarily the parties would contemplate
that damages would be based on the extent of the injury at the
time performance was due.
SUMMARY
It would seem that the common law doctrine of anticipatory
breach is sound and equitable, and that it is not inconsistent
with most of the basic principles of Louisiana law.
(1) Accepting the statement of most of the cases that the
preferred remedy for breach of contract in Louisiana is the
"award of damages, there seems no objection in this regard to the
adoption of the doctrine.
(2) There is some indirect jurisprudential support for the
doctrine, in that there have been cases allowing the institution
of suit prior to the time for performance stipulated in the con-
tract. However, these cases were in special and isolated in-
stances, and were supported by legislation.
(3) The Louisiana law regarding the mitigation of dam-
ages is in accord with that portion of the anticipatory breach
doctrine which allows the repudiatee to immediately discontinue
his own performance.
77. Id. at 642, 63 So.2d at 149.
78. Ibid.
79. LA. CIVIL CODe art. 1934 (1870) reads in part: "When the debtor has
been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable only for such damages as were
contemplated, or may reasonably be supposed to have entered the contemplation
of the parties at the time of the contract."
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(4) The Louisiana law of default is reconcilable with the
doctrine.
(5) Article 2052, while on its face presenting some objec-
tion to the doctrine, can be reconciled with the doctrine by read-
ing the article in conjunction with Articles 2053 and 1932.
There are, however, certain areas of the Louisiana law which
may well require some modification in the anticipatory breach
doctrine.
(1) Article 2047 of the Code may well overcome the common
law rule that a repudiator may not retract his repudiation after
suit is brought by the repudiatee in reliance on the repudiation.
(2) It is possible that the Louisiana rule as to the calcula-
tion of damages will cause some qualification of the anticipatory
breach doctrine.80
David W. Robertson
Revival of Judgments
Following the rendition of a favorable judgment, the plain-
tiff looks next to execution thereon. Often, however, there are
reasons which prevent successful execution at that time. For
example, if the judgment is one for money, immediate execution
may be deterred by reason of the defendant's insolvency. There-
fore, in those legal systems which place a limitation on the life
of a judgment there must be some means provided to extend this
period if execution is not to be barred by the mere lapse of time.
The purpose of this Comment is to compare the procedure per-
mitting extension of the life of a judgment at the common law, in
France, and in Louisiana. Major emphasis is placed on the re-
vival of judgments in Louisiana and the contributions of the pro-
posed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in this area.
Revival of Judgments at Common Law
At common law, if execution was not issued upon a judgment
within a year and a day, the judgment became dormant. After
this period it was presumed that the judgment had been satis-
80. For another discussion of the anticipatory breach doctrine in Louisiana
see Comment, Anticipatory Breach in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 586 (1933).
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